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The Building Act 2004 now requires Territorial Authorities (TAs) to have in place a policy 
setting out how they intend making existing buildings that would be unable to withstand a 
moderate earthquake safe for their occupiers.  Many of the resultant policies developed by 
TAs have put in place mandatory upgrade requirements that will force owners to expend 
large amounts of capital on seismic upgrading of their buildings.  The challenge for the 
property owners and TAs alike is to make such development work economic or the result 
will be wide scale demolition of old buildings.  This has serious implications for both 
heritage conservation and inner city revitalisation plans that are based on existing heritage 
buildings.  This paper sets out the issues and challenges for the seismic upgrading of 
buildings in New Zealand and puts forward some potential solutions. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
Early buildings in New Zealand were characterised by the use of timber which was both 
plentiful and cheap.  Problems with fire however encouraged the use of unreinforced masonry 
in towns and cities with little thought given to the perils of earthquakes prior to the disastrous 
Napier earthquake of 1931.  This resulted in the introduction of the first earthquake design 
standards in 1935.  Significant design changes were also introduced in 1965 and 1976 with 
additional refinements in 1984, 1992 and 2005.  These design changes recognised the 
growing body of knowledge about earthquakes and changes in construction methods.  The 
issue of designing buildings to survive earthquakes is not unique to New Zealand but one 
shared with many other countries including those located on the “pacific rim of fire” such as 
Japan and the east coast of the USA. 
 
Although the issue of designing new buildings to survive earthquakes has been addressed by 
improved design standards the issue of dealing with old buildings that were not designed to 
withstand earthquakes has long been a problem for Territorial Authorities (TAs) in New 
Zealand.  Under section 301 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1968 and then section 624 of 
the Local Government Act 1974 TAs were given wide ranging powers that enabled them to 
have the buildings made safe.  These powers were continued in section 66 of the Building Act 
1991 and remain in section 124 of the Building Act 2004.  However, the extent to which these 
powers have been used has varied widely between different local authorities.  A few TAs such 
as Wellington have used their powers in an active way by the serving of notices on owners 
requiring them to take action to make their buildings ‘safe’.  In order to do this the owners 
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must strengthen, demolish or ‘mothball’ their buildings.  Most TAs in New Zealand took a 
passive approach to using their powers and did not serve many section 66 notices on 
buildings.  This was evident in a 1997 survey of TAs by the Building Industry Authority 
(BIA) which showed that only 5 out of the 64 responding Councils had actually issued notices 
under section 66 of the Building Act (New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, 
1998). 
  
In response to concerns raised by the earthquake risk buildings study group of the New 
Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineers ( NZSEE), the Building Industry Authority began 
preliminary public consultation on Section 66 of the Building Act in 1997.  Consultation 
included a number of public forums in the major cities after which the BIA produced a 
discussion paper in February 1998 called “Keeping Buildings Safe and Sanitary”.  This paper 
contained a number of suggested changes to the Building Act in relation to earthquake prone 
buildings.  The process was then effectively put on hold however, as it became apparent that 
due to the leaky homes crisis the entire Building Act needed to be revised and not just section 
66.  This review process was lengthy but it eventually culminated in the passing of the new 
Building Act which came into force on the 30 November 2004.  The new Act is over 400 
pages long and has approximately 450 sections.  It is thus a comprehensive piece of building 
regulation legislation.  However most of the changes introduced by the new Act have limited 
specific impacts on the existing building stock. This paper focuses on those changes to the 
Building Act that are relevant to the owners and developers of old buildings.  The most 
significant changes are those relating to “earthquake prone” buildings which have 
incorporated many of the changes to Section 66 that were proposed back in 1998. 
 
One of the major changes which has occurred is in relation to the definition of what 
constitutes an “earthquake-prone” building.  This is now defined in section 122 of the new 
Act as follows: 
 
Section 122 Meaning of earthquake-prone building 
 
(1) A building is earthquake prone for the purposes of this Act if, having regard to its 
condition and to the ground on which it is built, and because of its construction, the building- 
 
(a) will have its ultimate capacity exceeded in a moderate earthquake (as defined 
in the regulations); and 
 
(b) would be likely to collapse causing- 
 
(i) injury or death to persons in the building or to persons on any other 
property; or 
 
  (ii) damage to any other property. 
 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to a building that is used wholly or mainly for residential 
purposes unless the building- 
 
(a) comprises 2 or more storeys; and 
 
(b) contains 3 or more household units. 
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The new definition set out in section 122 of the 2004 Act contains a number of significant 
changes compared with 1991 Act.  Under the 1991 Act only unreinforced masonry buildings 
were defined as earthquake-prone whereas the 2004 Act includes other buildings such as non 
masonry or concrete buildings.   
 
The old definition was based on compliance with the 1965 Chapter 8 Building Code to a level 
of 50% of this code.  This equates to structural strengths of approximately 10% of the current 
code.   
 
Note that the new definition of an earthquake-prone building now explicitly takes into 
account ground conditions as well as the structure of the building itself.  It is also linked to a 
further definition of what constitutes a moderate earthquake which is contained in the 
regulations.  This gives the potential to effectively change the definition of what constitutes 
an earthquake prone building at the discretion of the Building and Housing Department 
without having to change the Act itself. 
 
The current trigger level or minimum standard under the 2004 Act is equivalent to one third 
that of a new building.  This is specified in section 7 of the Building (Specified Systems, 
Change the Use, and Earthquake-prone Buildings) Regulations 2005 where a “moderate 
earthquake” is defined as: 
 
…in relation to a building, an earthquake that would generate shaking at the site of the 
building that is of the same duration as, but that is one-third as strong, as the earthquake 
shaking (determined by normal measures of acceleration, velocity, and displacement) that 
would be used to design a new building for that site. 
 
This means that far more buildings are now subject to Section 122 of the new Act than were 
caught by Section 66 of the old Act  as the new ‘trigger’ level will have the effect of 
reclassifying some buildings that  previously were not considered to be earthquake risks to 
become classified as dangerous.    
 
Having identified a building as either insanitary, dangerous or earthquake prone the TA has 
wide ranging powers under Section 124 to take action as follows: 
 
Section 124 Powers of territorial authorities in respect of dangerous, earthquake-prone, 
or insanitary buildings 
 
(1) If a territorial authority is satisfied that a building is dangerous, earthquake prone, or 
insanitary, the territorial authority may – 
 
 (a) put up a hoarding or fence to prevent people from approaching the building 
nearer than is safe: 
 
 (b) attach in a prominent place on, or adjacent to, the building a notice that warns 
people not to approach the building: 
 
 (c) gives written notice requiring work to be carried out on the building, within a 
time stated in the notice (which must not be less than 10 days after the notice is given under 
section 125), to – 
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  (i) reduce or remove the danger: or 
 
  (ii) prevent the building from remaining insanitary. 
 
(2) This section does not limit the powers of a territorial authority under this Part. 
 
(3) A person commits an offence if the person fails  to comply with a notice given under 
subsection (1) (c). 
 
(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable to a fine not exceeding 
$200,000. 
 
The powers conferred on TAs under section 124 in relation to earthquake prone buildings are 
nothing new and are similar to the powers under the 1991 Act and before that to those under 
section 624 of the Local Government Act.  As discussed earlier what is new is the ‘threshold’ 
level contained in the regulations.   
 
Another significant change in the Act is the requirement for TAs to prepare and adopt a policy 
that explicitly addresses the problem of earthquake prone buildings (and unsafe and 
unsanitary buildings).  Under existing legislation the response of TAs to this problem has 
generally been limited with Wellington City being one notable exception.  The 1991 Act left 
it up to the individual TAs to decide to what extent they proactively enforced section 66.  
Most chose not to enforce section 66 but the new requirements imposed by sections 131 and 
132 as detailed below makes this option less politically tenable. 
 
Section 131  Territorial local authorities must adopt policy on dangerous, earthquake-
prone, and insanitary buildings. 
 
(1) A territorial authority must, within 18 months after the commencement of this section, 
adopt a policy on dangerous, earthquake-prone, and insanitary buildings within its district. 
 
(2) The policy must state- 
 
(a) the approach that the territorial authority will take in performing its functions 
under this Part; and 
 
(b) the territorial authority’s priorities in performing those functions; and 
 
(c) how the policy will apply to heritage buildings   
 
  
Section 132 Adoption and review of policy 
 
(1) A policy under section 131 must be adopted in accordance with the special 
consultative procedure in section 83 of the Local Government Act 2002. 
 
(2) A policy may be amended or replaced only in accordance with the special consultative 
procedure, and this section applies to that amendment or replacement. 
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(3) A territorial authority must, as soon as practicable after adopting or amending a 
policy, provide a copy of the policy to the chief executive. 
 
(4) A territorial authority must complete a review of a policy within 5 years after the 
policy is adopted and then at intervals of not more than 5 years. 
 
(5) A policy does not cease to have effect because it is due for review or being reviewed. 
 
In response to section 131 each TA had to develop a suitable policy by 31 May 2006.  Note 
that under section 131 the TA is only required to adopt a policy and there are still no 
legislative directives as to the form that this policy must take.  It would therefore be possible 
that a TA could adopt a policy that did nothing in terms of regulating earthquake prone 
buildings.  Clearly though the policy is expected to achieve the purpose of the Act – in 
particular the “health and safety provisions” embodied in Sections 3 which sets out the 
purpose of the Act.  There also appears to be a degree of review by the chief executive of the 
Department of Building and Housing and it is clearly the intention of the new Act to 
encourage TAs to take a more proactive role in addressing the problem.  The Department of 
Building and Housing developed a “Policy Template” and some “Policy Guidelines” 
(Department of Building and Housing, 2005) as an aid to Territorial Authorities (TAs).   
 
The role of the Policy Guidelines document is described as follows:  
 
The document is intended to act as a resource from which can draw in developing their 
individual policies.  It is not prescriptive.  It is expected that TAs, in consultation with their 
communities, will develop policies that strike a balance between the need to address earthquake 
risk and other priorities, taking account of the social and economic implications of implementing 
the policy.  
 
The policy guide sets out the two main approaches that can be used by Councils and which 
are characterised as either “active” or “passive”.  These approaches are described in the 
guidance notes as follows: 
 1 Approaches to policy implementation  
 
Before a TA submits its draft Earthquake Prone Buildings (EPB) policy for community 
consultation, it should consider the way in which it wishes to implement its policy.  The 
Department considers that there are two principle approaches that TAs could adopt.  
An active approach  
Under an active approach, a TA would carry out an initial evaluation of buildings in its 
district to identify those likely to be at high risk.  In the light of this, the TA should establish 
priorities for further, more detailed evaluations, set timetables for action and set guidelines of 
required performance levels for upgrading.  
A TA would then advise building owners that their buildings are likely to be earthquake-prone 
and, if appropriate, seek from them a detailed assessment of the building.  The policy should 
address which party will bear the cost of the assessment.  
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Adoption of this approach will provide a TA with the best possible risk reduction programme as 
it is able to set and control the level of any work required to mitigate risk.  
A passive approach  
If a TA were to adopt a more reactive approach, the Initial Evaluation Process (IEP) and 
detailed assessment and any improvement of structural performance would be triggered by an 
application under the Building Act for building alteration, change of use, extension of life or 
subdivision.  
 
With this arrangement, on receipt of an application relating to a building that the desktop 
research indicated could be earthquake-prone, a TA would undertake an IEP on the building.  If 
this process indicated that the building was likely to be earthquake-prone, the TA would seek a 
detailed assessment of the building’s structural performance before issuing a building consent.  If 
the detailed assessment indicated that a building was earthquake-prone, a TA would issue a 
notice to reduce or remove the danger to the level set out in its EPB policy.  This work could be 
undertaken as part of the building work for which an owner seeks consent.  However, once an 
application activates the EPB policy, a TA should require any necessary upgrading to be 
undertaken even if a building owner decides not to undertake the building work set out in the 
application.  
 
This second approach has the significant disadvantage that it relies on a somewhat 
haphazard order of remediation based essentially on an owner’s intention for a building.  
This could leave some significant high-risk buildings untouched for a long period of time.  
On the other hand, the cost of administering such a programme would be significantly less 
than for an active programme.  
 
Despite saying that the guidelines are not prescriptive the purpose of the legislation is to 
‘spur’ TA’s into being more proactive regarding earthquake strengthening and there is a clear 
bias in the guidelines towards the implementation of an ‘active approach’.  The results of this 
encouragement can be seen in a summary  of the various policies that has been compiled by 
The Department of Building and Housing relating to the various earthquake-prone building 
policies from all 73 TAs.  This shows that approximately 45% have adopted an active policy, 
32% have adopted a passive policy and the remaining 23% have policies that are both active 
and passive ((Department of Building and Housing, 2008). 
 
 
2.0 Economic Impacts  
 
The economic impacts of the implementation of earthquake prone buildings policies are likely 
to be substantial when measured at both a community level and as they affect individual 
property owners.  In general the effects on the property market and economy will clearly 
depend on the number of buildings affected. Although the number of earthquake prone 
buildings in New Zealand has been in decline due to both demolitions and voluntary 
strengthening, this long term trend will be countered by the change in definition contained in 
the regulations.  This change captures buildings that are currently between approximately 
10% (i.e. 50 % of the 1965 Code) and 33.33% of current code and were previously not 
defined as earthquake prone buildings.  It is not clear what that number will be but it will 
undoubtedly contain some of the early examples of concrete buildings built in the 30’s, 40’s 
and 50’s. The number of buildings that will be affected will vary from locality to locality but 
it has been estimated by the department of Building and Housing that up to 10% of buildings 
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built between 1935 and 1976 could be earthquake prone depending on their location and their 
structural characteristics. Buildings built after 1976 are unlikely to be earthquake prone but 
cannot be excluded from possible assessment (Department of Building and Housing, Web 
Site).  Note that virtually all buildings built prior to 1935 are likely to be earthquake prone 
unless they have been significantly structurally strengthened. 
 
Section 131 policies impose an element of economic obsolescence that has the potential to 
seriously erode the existing values of some old buildings.  Anecdotal evidence would tend to 
support the view that market awareness regarding the potential liabilities and legal obligations 
relating to earthquake prone buildings is limited.  Therefore the premise behind much of the 
following discussion is that the property market is far from efficient and that future 
obligations imposed by the changes in legislation have generally not been anticipated by the 
market and factored into investment decisions.  As a result there is insufficient weighting 
given to potential earthquake strengthening costs in investment and purchase decisions.  
Buyers therefore pay too much for their old buildings because their due diligence fails to 
adequately account for earthquake strengthening requirements.  This situation is encouraged 
by vendors and real estate agents ‘playing down’ the situation and the confusion or market 
disinformation regarding the degree to which existing buildings may have been strengthened. 
The reason for this is due to ignorance in the market about current strengthening levels.  Most 
buildings that have been ‘strengthened’ in the past have been strengthened to comparatively 
low levels when compared with the current code.  Many tenants or owners have purchased or 
leased buildings in the belief that they have been “strengthened” or even “fully strengthened 
to 100% of Code” without fully understanding what this means.  They are unaware that the 
code being referred to is the 1965 Code and that as a result the degree of strengthening is 
substantially less than that of a comparable new building.    
 
Although it is the contention of this paper that many market players are uniformed regarding 
earthquake strengthening requirements, this is clearly a generalisation that will not apply to all 
sub markets. There will be some informed potential purchasers who will factor earthquake 
strengthening costs into their investment decisions.  In most cases they will be out bid by less 
informed purchasers unless it is their intention to demolition or alternatively they have an 
economically viable change of use planned for the building.  Both of these scenarios render 
earthquake strengthening requirements under a section 131 policy largely irrelevant.  
Alternatively some  purchasers may have paid a ‘high’ price because they consider that the 
liabilities of earthquake strengthening that are to be imposed are so far in the future that they 
can largely be discounted or that perhaps they may not be effectively enforced.  Some 
purchasers may also assume that some form of local government subsidy or compensation 
will be available to off set these future costs.  Future research to test market awareness of 
section 131 policies would be highly valuable.   
 
The issue of earthquake strengthening has undoubtedly already got a wider public profile with 
the introduction of section 131 policies by TAs which required that the special consultative 
process set out in the Local Government Act was adhered to.  This should have already 
increased market awareness and this education process will continue as policies are 
implemented.    
 
The need for market education has been identified by the New Zealand Society of Earthquake 
Engineers (NZSEE) who have been concerned at the apparent lack of market awareness.  
They advocate that in addition to the regulatory requirements of the Building Act that a non 
regulatory method of building gradings be introduced by TAs.  The purpose of such a grading 
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system would be to ultimately achieve levels of strengthening greater than those imposed by 
regulation.  The regulations are seen by the NZSEE as a “backstop” while the gradings are 
designed to “raise awareness in the industry and allow market forces to work.  In time, the 
owners of lowest grade buildings would find themselves under pressure to improve or face 
loss of revenue”(NZSEE, 2000).  Such a public grading system would mean that those dealing 
with a building (such as owners, purchasers, tenants and workers) could do so with 
knowledge of its seismic resistance.  This may well raise concerns amongst employers of their 
obligations under the Health and Safety in Employment Act in terms of housing employees in 
buildings that are of comparatively low strength and hence high risk.  Such a grading system 
may have a dramatic effect on the market for old buildings by leading to a significant 
reduction in rents and values.  The reductions would depend on the extent to which occupiers 
perceive there to be a real safety risk.  If they see the risk as significant then it is possible that 
some old buildings may become unusable as employers seek to comply with the Health and 
Safety Act by refusing to house their employees in buildings that are deemed to be not safe.  
It may also eventually force all TA’s to enforce a proactive section 131 policy due to 
consumer or public demands for safe buildings. 
 
The insurance industry has a greater knowledge regarding the effective levels of earthquake 
strengthening than most owners and tenants.  In their opinion a building that has been 
strengthened up to Full 1965 Code or even to one third of current code remains essentially an 
unstrengthened building.  Such a building has been strengthened to the point that the lives of 
its occupants have been safeguarded but the building itself is unlikely to survive a substantial 
earthquake.  Unstrengthened or partly strengthened buildings have had massive increases in 
the cost of their insurance or in some cases have struggled to obtain insurance at all.  This 
situation is unlikely to improve and both the ability to obtain adequate insurance and the cost 
of insurance may therefore become important issues for some old buildings.  High insurance 
costs increase the operating expenses of old buildings compared with more modern 
competitors thus making them less competitive with newer building stock. This reduces their 
economic viability and has a negative impact on the values of old buildings.  It also provides a 
positive incentive to owners to strengthen their buildings to high levels acceptable to their 
insurers.  Clearly the insurance industry has a role to play both in raising market awareness 
and in encouraging earthquake strengthening. 
 
 
Impacts of an Active Approach 
 
The economic impacts of the section 131 policies will vary depending on the approach taken.  
In theory the impacts of an “active” approach are likely to be more severe than those of a 
passive approach.  An owner forced to comply with an active approach faces the cost of an 
“Initial Evaluation” although some TA’s are paying for this.  If identified as a potential 
earthquake prone building at this initial stage they must then meet the cost of a “Detailed 
Evaluation” and if this proves the building to be earthquake-prone they must then take action 
within the time frames set down in the policy.  Assuming they choose to strengthen then they 
must pay for engineering design and construction costs. These costs are likely to come under 
strong inflationary pressures if there are large numbers of property owners being required to 
upgrade at the same time.  
 
In addition to these direct costs the owner may need to meet a number of indirect costs.  For 
example there may be borrowing costs related to obtaining money to finance the work.  Given 
the current global credit crunch obtaining finance may be difficult for some owners.  Another 
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significant indirect cost of upgrading is the degree of disruption that it might involve in terms 
of the occupants of the buildings.  Where a building is tenanted then this might be seen as a 
major problem as the landlord will be trying to avoid disruption to their tenants.  There may 
also be a loss of rental income as tenants are relocated while the work is carried out or in 
some cases there may be a loss of tenants altogether where the existing lease is short term or 
due to expire. 
 
In most cases the functional utility of a building is not increased by earthquake strengthening 
retrofits and in fact may be impaired.  For example there may be a loss of useable or rentable 
floor area, the aesthetic appearances of the building may suffer, and there maybe a reduction 
of natural light.   
 
The challenge for the owner therefore is to capture added value resulting from their 
expenditure on earthquake strengthening. However, much of the potential upside or potential 
for added value relies on the market already having discounted unstrengthened buildings thus 
providing the ability to recapture this lost value.  For existing owners who have already paid 
‘full price’ the best that they are likely to achieve is to maintain their existing values. 
Depending on the lease of the building the landlord may try and recover the costs of the 
upgrade back from the tenant by way of an “Improvement Rent Percentage” such as is 
contained in Auckland District Law Society Lease.  However, this may cause hardship for the 
tenant and in addition the tenant is likely to be very resistant to paying increased rents unless 
their utility is clearly improved in some way.   
 
The potential for added value is possible if the owner can achieve lower operating expenses 
due to reduced insurance costs, or obtain higher occupancy rates by overcoming market 
concerns regarding health and safety.  In a well informed market the capitalisation rates 
should be lower for strengthened buildings due to their lower risk as an investment.  
Making this added value equal the direct and indirect costs of the strengthening is the 
challenge to the owner.  If they are unable to capture sufficient added value from the 
expenditure on earthquake strengthening then it may not be economically feasible to 
strengthen the building.  Where the reduction in the value of the building is such that the 
added value of the buildings becomes negligible then such buildings may be demolished, 
particularly if this allows the site to be used as a car park to provide holding income.   
 
As well as the economic impacts on the individual private property owner there may be 
specific and significant financial impacts on community groups or organisations that own old 
buildings and do not have the budgets to undertake upgrading.  Falling into this category are 
churches, schools and charitable organisations.  This might lead to a number of negative 
social impacts if the operation of these organisations is adversely effected by the need to close 
buildings, sell buildings or upgrade buildings.  Central and local government are also going to 
need to find substantial amounts of capital to strengthen their own buildings which will 
increase pressure to increase rates and taxes. 
 
Critics of active strengthening policies such as Ian Smith (Smith, 2000) argue that the 
increased stringency is unnecessary as the benefits of strengthening will and are being 
achieved by a process of natural attrition and regeneration which forces a need for upgrade 
due to change of use and alterations.  They consider that the social costs are high as most 
earthquake prone buildings are owned by family trusts and small businesses  
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Impacts of a Passive Approach 
 
Under a passive approach a requirement to do a seismic upgrade will be triggered by either an 
application to alter a building or alternatively to carry out a change of use on a building. 
In theory the implementation of a passive approach should take longer as it will occur as part 
of the natural aging and regeneration process that occurs over time for building stock.  
Therefore it is less likely to cause any ‘shocks’ to the property market.  In addition it should 
be less onerous on the property owner and therefore have less of a negative economic impact.   
The upgrade requirements triggered by alterations are less extensive and therefore less of an 
issue than those triggered by a change in use.  A change of use requires that a building be 
upgraded to a structural level that is as near as reasonably practicable to that of a new 
building.  This has been interpreted by most TAs to mean up to a level that is at least two 
thirds that of current code.  
 
In both instances the decision to alter or change the use is theoretically at the discretion of the 
owner and thus should be less of a threat than an upgrade forced by a section 124 notice.  
There is the potential for the owner to minimise their indirect expenses and this is one of the 
benefits of implementing a passive policy in relation to earthquake prone buildings.  In theory 
it can be done at a time which suits the owner and when it is economically viable.  However 
the fear of triggering a structural upgrade by carrying out alterations can potentially be to 
reduce the investment in older buildings.  This has been the case in cities where the TA has 
taken a passive approach to earthquake prone buildings.  Owners may decide to defer 
alterations or to leave buildings vacant rather than trigger additional upgrade requirements 
that do not appear economically feasible.  Alternatively owners may indulge in a certain 
amount of illegal building work or fail to inform the TA of a change of use. 
 
 
3.0 The Impacts on CBD Revitalisation 
 
Earthquake prone buildings are particularly prevalent in the CBDs of our older cities and 
towns.  Many of these cities and towns are concerned with the need to maintain and revitalize 
the economic health of their traditional CBD and main street shopping areas.  For example, 
the city of Christchurch has for some time had a strategy to revitalise the inner city which has 
been in gradual decline for many years.  There are strong concerns that Christchurch may 
become a “donut’ city if this decline is not reversed. Central to this aim of revitalisation is the 
need to retain the character of CBD areas by retaining heritage buildings in order to create a 
‘sense of place’.  This is also an important part of the Urban Design Protocols signed by many 
TAs and used as a guide to future development.   Many regional towns also have main streets 
areas dominated by old buildings that are currently only marginally economic.  For example 
towns like Timaru, Hastings and Wanganui.     
 
The concern is that the imposition of an onerous policy actively targeting old buildings will 
create large numbers of economic ‘white elephants’. With the current global credit crunch and 
the decline in property markets it will become particularly challenging to make new 
developments stack up.  It will also be rare for refurbishment and the upgrading of old 
buildings to be economically feasible.  Old buildings will be demolished even though it will 
be uneconomic to replace them with new development.  These demolitions may destroy any 
character or ‘sense of place’ that could be used as a building block for future revitalisation.  
Alternatively those buildings not demolished may become vacant and neglected and thus 
become a target for vandalism creating a downward spiral in the fortunes of the 
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CBD/mainstreet localities in which they are located.  The creation of ‘blighted’ areas 
characterised by vacant sites and vandalised buildings will lead to further erosion of values 
for individual properties.   
 
Ultimately a reduction in the value of old buildings may also mean that it becomes feasible to 
convert the property to an alternative use.  This is similar to the situation that occurred after 
the share market collapse when reduced values for commercial buildings made it feasible to 
convert them to residential use.  Although the existing owners of old buildings will suffer 
from the loss in value it may benefit new owners and developers in terms of creating 
conversion and refurbishment opportunities.  If the supply of redevelopment sites is increased 
substantially by wide scale demolition of old buildings then this will also negatively impact 
on the value of sites for redevelopment.  Assuming there is still demand for development 
product within the locality then the feasibility of marginal developments will be improved by 
cheaper land costs.   
 
However there is a danger that a prolonged economic downturn as predicted by many 
economic commentators combined with the creation of blighted urban areas could severely 
retard this regeneration.  Many TAs have taken a passive or relaxed approach to identifying 
and upgrading earthquake prone buildings due to concerns that a proactive approach will 
impose too great an economic and social cost on communities and lead to the blight discussed 
above.  The retention of key heritage buildings may be one way to prevent the blight 
becoming terminal and provide a resource to build on once the current economic and property 




4.0 Heritage Issues 
 
In terms of heritage buildings the potentially negative impacts of a policy prepared under 
section 131 can be significant.  Inevitably a large proportion of heritage buildings also fall 
within the category of earthquake prone buildings in under the Building Act.  This creates 
considerable tension between the health and safety objectives of the BA and the heritage 
retention objectives of the Resource Management Act (RMA).   
 
This tension was recognised by the select committee which had a new clause 131 (2) (c) 
inserted before the final reading of the Building Act.  This clause explicitly requires that the 
potential impact of any policy in relation to heritage buildings must be addressed.  Any policy 
should aim to avoid or minimise the loss of built heritage.  Although the drive to strengthen 
earthquake prone buildings is based around saving lives it is also compatible with the 
objective of strengthening heritage buildings so that they are better able to withstand 
earthquakes.  The demolition of a heritage building by an earthquake is equally to be avoided 
as the demolition of a heritage building by a developer.  Therefore, as a general rule the 
highest level of strengthening possible should be encouraged within the limitations imposed 
by economic constraints.   
 
The level of strengthening required to comply with the Building Act may be below the level 
that will actually provide significant protection to the building itself.  The occupants 
themselves may be made safe but the building may still be effectively destroyed.  What is 
appropriate for heritage buildings will be to strengthen to “as near to new as is reasonably 
practicable” in both an engineering and heritage sense. 
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In order to do this may require financial support or a subsidy where a clear need is 
demonstrated for a particular building.  Financial assistance may be required where it is 
proven to be necessary to tip the economic balance in favour of a successful heritage outcome 
and to avoid demolition.  It can also be done by providing certainty to the market place in 
relation to information, and thus prevent unrealistic or undesirable investment backed 
expectations.  One way of doing this might be to commission feasibility studies or due 
diligence if necessary or appropriate. 
 
An alternative non-regulatory approach would be to subsidise the costs of earthquake 
strengthening of heritage buildings as was done in Wellington.  This approach could be used 
to encourage the voluntary strengthening of buildings. 
 
The spending of public money to subsidise the private costs of earthquake strengthening can 
be justified on the grounds that it is in the public good.  With the introduction of the RMA in 
New Zealand the protection of heritage has received enhanced attention by TAs.  This has 
also been increased by the elevation of heritage protection as a matter of national importance.  
As a result many heritage buildings are scheduled in District Plans with strong rules to protect 
them from demolition or unsympathetic alterations.  However there is the potential to 
challenge heritage controls under section 85(3) of the RMA which provides relief to owners 
who are unable to put their properties to “reasonable use”.  There is a lack of case law to 
clarify what constitutes reasonable use but a building that requires the expenditure of large 
amounts of capital to earthquake strengthen with limited economic benefit to the owner may 
well fall into this category. 
 
In terms of strengthening costs it is not just the financial cost of doing the upgrade but also the 
damage to the heritage fabric of the building which must be considered.   This makes it more 
difficult and potentially more expensive for the owners of heritage buildings to comply with 
earthquake strengthening requirements.  If TAs require strengthening that is not obtrusive or 
damaging to the heritage fabric of the building then this may increase the costs of the 
upgrade. 
 
Where TA’s have taken a pro active approach in dealing with earthquake prone buildings by 
serving notices on the owners their actions have often been tempered by the use of financial 
incentives or subsidies.  For example concerns that such a proactive approach was 
encouraging the demolition of heritage buildings led to Wellington using financial incentives 
to subsidise earthquake strengthening for heritage buildings.   
 
As well as the option of strengthening or demolition owners may also ‘mothball’ their 
buildings in order to remove the danger.  This however is not usually a viable economic 
alternative for private building owners.  It is therefore a strategy that is unlikely to be used by 
owners unless it is necessary to ‘buy time’ before commencing a major refurbishment, change 




5.0 Taxation Issues  
 
From a taxation point of view the treatment of earthquake strengthening costs is somewhat 
contentious.  Inland Revenue have taken the position that expenses relating to earthquake 
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strengthening are capital expenditure that must be depreciated over the life of the building 
whereas some owners have argued that the expense is akin to deferred maintenance and 
should be allowed to be claimed as an expense in its entirety.  The position of Inland Revenue 
appears to have changed over time and where once earthquake strengthening costs were 
allowed as a deduction against revenue this is no longer the case.  This change appears to 
have been brought about by changes in the tax legislation (the repeal of section108 of the 
Income Tax Act 1976) and also the increased costs of earthquake strengthening costs bought 





The implementation of policies prepared under section 131 of the Building Act has the 
potential to impose significant financial and social costs on individual building owners and 
communities.  By necessity such policies are a risk management strategy that must try and 
achieve a balance between risk reduction and costs.  From a risk management point of view 
immediate and mandatory strengthening is the ideal answer but this must be balanced against 
the costs that such a policy would impose.  Any policy will therefore be a pragmatic 
compromise.  The success of this compromise will probably be judged in the future with the 
use of 20:20 hindsight in relation to if and when a severe earthquake occurs near a major 
urban centre.  In general however, a number of general recommendations can be made to help 
achieve a good compromise. 
 
Lengthen the process to allow for a gradual market adjustment. 
If the cost of upgrading can be deferred into the future then in valuation terms it is discounted 
to a smaller present value and is less onerous on the owner.  It also allows flexibility in terms 
of fitting around existing tenancies and other potential building alterations such as 
refurbishments or changes of use.  Too concentrated a time to comply is likely to add to the 
cost if construction capacity in terms of labour and materials are stretched.  An extended time 
also allows for opportunities provided by changes in property cycles.  Forcing upgrades to 
occur in a market downturn or recession will lead to difficulties.  Balanced against this 
however the comparative risk of each building may be used as the criteria to enforce different 
deadline on building owners and TAs have commonly adopted such a strategy.  Clearly the 
seismic risk of the particular locality clearly needs to be considered. 
 
Providing certainty in the process. 
The property market reacts to uncertainty by increasing the risk premium for investment.  If 
investors can accurately assess their liability for upgrading in terms of time frames, levels of 
strengthening and financial costs then the risk premium relating to earthquake strengthening is 
reduced.  To a certain extent the need for flexibility and certainty are conflicting objectives 
but a balance should be achieved.  For example, once deadlines are imposed they should be  
enforced, however flexibility to relax the deadlines can also be included as long as these are 
based on clear guidelines and criteria. 
 
Provide information that allows the market to behave more efficiently.   
In this way owners and investors will be able to make sound investment decisions.  This will 
require a balanced and sound communication programme to avoid over reaction while at the 
same time educating owners as to their responsibilities under the Building Act and the 
implications of non-compliance.  The effectiveness of such an approach will largely depend 
on the public having access to good information and also how the public perceives or 
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interprets such information.  If they rate the risk factor as low then there may well be little 
pressure on owners to strengthen.   The grading system proposed by the NZSEE would  
appear an appropriate method of increasing market awareness. 
 
Encourage appropriate strengthening levels. 
Legally it would appear that the maximum that can be enforced in terms of a policy developed 
under section 131 of the Building Act 2004 is that of the threshold level.  There are clearly 
benefits in advocating for higher levels of strengthening in terms of risk reduction and in 
order to future proof the buildings by accommodating any future change of use.  A problem in 
Wellington has been the need to enforce a second more rigorous strengthening of a building 
that has undergone a change of use.    Ultimately it may be non-regulatory approaches such as 
using public gradings that will encourage market led demand for higher strengthening levels 
than that imposed by section 131 policies.  Alternatively financial incentives could be used 
particularly for heritage buildings where high levels of strengthening are desirable. 
 
 
Introduce appropriate incentives to help retain heritage buildings. 
The need to earthquake strengthen will render some buildings uneconomic and lead to their 
demolition.  To prevent this in the case of buildings with high heritage value will require the 
use of appropriate incentives such as grants, rates relief or tax relief.  Tax credits have been a 
powerful tool used to promote the retention and rehabilitation of heritage buildings in the 
USA.  A similar approach is worthy of consideration in New Zealand.  As a minimum, 
consideration regarding the deductibility of costs as a revenue item rather than a capital item 
should be investigated. 
 
 
Consider staged upgrading 
One way to meet the economic challenges of earthquake strengthening would be to strengthen 
the building over a number of stages.  In this way risk reduction can be achieved while 
lowering the economic impacts on the owner.  For such a strategy to be effective however 
would require expert engineering input and a clear schedule of strengthening that would be 
legally binding.  In a similar way where buildings are being strengthened up to one third of 
current code there should be engineering advice obtained as design such strengthening to be 
enhanced in a cost efficient way in the future.  Research into potential methods of carrying 
out strengthening in a series of planned and co-ordinated stages should be a priority. 
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